Introduction
Rationalefor trade policy reform. Trade reform profiscal deficit. The second is that there are no grams have two main objectives. The first is to strong grounds for believing that trade liberalihelp raise economic growth and employment zation raises economic efficiency and the growth generation by improving resource allocation and of output and exports, and that the protection of economywide efficiency. The second is to help import-substitution activities, especially infant improve the balance of payments by strengthenindustries, will do more to promote economic ing the competitiveness of the external sector and growth. Moreover, world conditions might not expanding exports and efficient import substipermit reforming countries to increase their extutes. The importance of each objective has varports and export revenues. 2 The third concern is ied from country to country. Most developing that the import liberalization's adjustments in countries have structural rigidities and trade rethe production structure may produce unemploystrictions that obstruct economic growth. Many ment and devaluations may increase the inflaof them, in the wake of adverse external shocks, tion rate. rising fiscal deficits, and serious balance of payments problems of the early 1980s, responded
Focus of the paper. This paper evaluates deinitially by tightening their import restrictionsveloping country experience with trade policy a response that intensified the bias against trade, reforms and makes recommendations for improvparticularly exports. But with balance of paying the design and implementation of those rements problems persisting, they began to reform forms. It assesses the extent and effectiveness of trade policies and make their economies more the reforms under adjustment programs in the open. Such reforms have figured prominently in 1980s, highlighting practical problems and conthe policy changes supported by World Bank adstraints, both economic and political. 3 In particujustment loans and by IMF arrangements, lendlar, it examines the effect of the Bank's adjusting intended in part to finance temporary inment lending on trade policy and economic percreases in imports (without corresponding informance. Broadly speaking, it considers three creases in exports) that greater openness might issues: (1) the potential conflicts between trade bring. 1 policy reforms and macroeconomic stabilization efforts, (2) the supply response to trade policy Objections to trade liberalization. Three conreforms, in the context of export prospects and cerns have been raised about trade liberalization: domestic and external constraints, and (3) the seThe first is that trade liberalization conflicts with quencing, timing, and duration of import reforms, other, more important policy objectives, particutheir relation to internal reforms, and the associlarly those for the balance of payments and the ated transitional costs.
The paper finds that trade policy reform, policy affecting the export and import regimes when implemented well, has contributed to imand the domestic sector. "Trade policy reform" proved economic performance in developing has many meanings, but in this report it covers countries. Such reform is essential for linking measures that move the trade regime toward a developing economies to technological advances more neutral incentive framework for foreign and for enabling them to compete in an increastrade, toward a more liberal trade regime, or ingly integrated world -the reality of business toward both. Neutrality refers here to incentives today. But to strengthen the effectiveness of trade among and between exportables and importables, reforms, their design and implementation must between sales to domestic and export markets, take into account interactions with reforms of and between tradables and nontradables. A more other key policies, with institutions, and with liberal trade regime refers to the reduction of infrastructure. The analysis here shows that the controls and to the replacement of direct controls supply response has been stronger in countries and interventions by price mechanisms. Policies where institutions and infrastructure supported for greater neutrality usually involve liberalizathe reforms and resource reallocation. That tion measures: for example, lowering export and response has also depended on how well the import restrictions. But greater neutrality may interconnections with other macroeconomic and also come from interventions to develop exports sectoral policies were addressed.
-for example, duty drawbacks. (table 1) .6 With nine "Intencently, Turkey. In nearly all these countries, the sity of Proposed Reform" indicators (not mutubias against trade and particularly exportables ally exclusive), the proposed reform measures declined in part as a result of the reduced import could be considered "strong" in 31 percent of the protection. 8 For most other countries, however, cases, "moderate" in 45 percent, and "mild ' in the data to evaluate reductions in the antiexport the remaining 24 percent. Policy proposals for bias are lacking. For the recipients of trade adexports and quantitative restrictions were generjustment loans, the measured ratios of imports to ally stronger than those for the level and disper-GDP (in current and constant prices) have risen sion of tariffs.
relative to those for nonrecipient countries, indicating the influence of both increased financing Implementation record. Reform implemenand import liberalization. tation by trade loan recipients varied substantially across countries and policy areas .' In some Constraints to better implementation. Policy countries, there was little progress in reformschanges and outcomes have been more extensive or reforms were reversed -during in trade policy than in most other areas of adjust-(Guyana, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); ment lending. But policy implementation, espethere was modest progress in others (Bangladesh cially with respect to protection levels, has been and Madagascar); and there was considerable weaker than expected. Four sets of domestic fac- 1980s and longer-term experience suggest that borers, but there may also be increases in the trade policy and structural reforms have contribemployment of low-income laborers. uted to the growth in output and exports. Real exchange rate depreciation and commercial pol-
The supply response. The response of outicy reform are linked to such improved performput to policy change varies considerably across ance. The additional financing and policy recountries. Country studies identify several facforms connected with adjustment lending have tors that may abet or constrain the supply reeach contributed to relative improvements in the sponse. 1980s. After controlling for some other factors, * Insufficient attention to the institutional and trade adjustment lending is associated with a infrastructural needs of exporters has often been mild improvement in GDP, exports, and other a problem (weak systems for providing duty-free variables. This improvement is stronger and staand restriction-free access to imported inputs; intistically more significant among early and intenadequate port, transport and telecommunications sive loan recipients (those receiving three or more facilities; and poor information and marketing adjustment loans with a substantial trade composervices for exporters). nent). Accordingly, the results measured for all * Domestic regulatory policies determine recipients are likely to understate the benefits whether incentives actually change in response because they include outcomes of early stages of to reform (price decontrols) and affect the mobila continuing process for some. The results are ity of factors of production in response to changes also stronger and statistically more significant in incentives (labor regulation, market entry and when the comparison is between trade policy exit regulations, foreign investment controls). reformers and nonreformers rather than simply * Some public sector policies do not support between trade loan recipients and nonrecipients.
rapid adjustment to a changed incentive structure (allocation mechanisms in centrally planned Import versus export reform. The evidence economies, and parastatal domination of agriculsuggests that developing countries have benetural markets, as with many export crops in Affited economically from a combination of exrica). change rate depreciation and commercial policy * Growing protection in international markets reform. The stimulus to exports and output from in the 1980s has depressed world prices and rea real devaluation combined with reductions in duced market access, reducing the response of export restrictions and measures for export deexports, especially in agriculture. For manufacvelopment are likely to be more immediate than tured exports, industrial countries are promising those from a real devaluation combined with immarkets because of low tariffs, but nontariff barport liberalization. At the same time, efficient, riers in some important product categories (texlonger-term development of exports and output tiles, clothing, and steel) have hurt the export depends not only on export policies but on imgrowth of developing countries. port liberalization. The analysis supports the * Credibility of reforms, which affects their need to emphasize a combination of export and sustainability, depends on the country's track import policy reform as a complement to exrecord in policy reform, on the effectiveness of change rate and macroeconomic adjustment. 9 Althe initial steps, on the macroeconomic stability though import liberalization is often expected to of the economy, and on the consistency with other cause short-term unemployment, a recent study reforms (such as those for the financial sector and of 19 countries found no clear empirical evidence for agricultural pricing). linking the two in aggregate. There is, however, * When entrepreneurial and managerial capacsome evidence in another study suggesting that a ity are underdeveloped, the supply response is real devaluation is associated with decreases in inevitably slower. Shortages of trained labor and real wages, particularly those of low-income lapoorly developed input supply lines have also been serious problems.
Sequencing and Timing of Reforms
Consistency of liberalization with stabilization. One ation is highly unstable. The foregoing paraissue is whether the liberalization is inconsistent graph shows that trade policy reform and stabiliwith stabilization efforts -whether tariff reform zation, when carried out in parallel, have in most may lead to revenue losses, devaluation may ininstances been successful. But if inflation is very crease inflation, and liberalization may aggrahigh and variable, leads and lags in the movevate balance of payments problems. Indeed, there ment of individual prices mean that the resulting is little doubt that macroeconomic instability relative prices are a poor guide for economic makes trade (and other) reforms more difficult to decisions. In addition, the real exchange rate is implement successfully. For this reason, some likely to appreciate and thus conflict with trade analysts argue that fiscal deficits and inflation reform goals if the authorities use the exchange rates should be reduced before introducing trade rate (rather than adequate macroeconomic polipolicy reforms. In practice, however, the strong cies) as a "brake on inflation." Thus, aspects of trade policy reformers have also generally mantrade reform whose effectiveness depends on relaaged to reduce simultaneously the fiscal deficit, tive price changes are unlikely to succeed until the inflation rate, and the balance of payments very high rates of inflation are brought down. deficit more than have the weaker reformers in the sample (table 2) . For one thing, substituting
Interaction of trade and fiscal reform. A varitariffs for quantitative restrictions has been beneety of trade reforms complement the fiscal adficial from the fiscal viewpoint. Furthermore, justment. Eliminating nontariff barriers -espewhere the fiscal deficit has been sufficiently recially converting them to equivalent tariffsduced and the real exchange rate depreciated, and eliminating tariff exemptions are revenuethe current account deficit has also declined deenhancing (Jamaica, Kenya, and Mauritius). spite import liberalization. In these circumstances, Reducing tariffs and harmonizing them can be import liberalization can reduce inflation and revenue-neutral or revenue-enhancing if the lower contribute to stabilization by providing much tariff rates are offset by a more depreciated exneeded competition in the domestic markets. Dechange rate. And reducing very high tariff rates valuation raises the domestic prices of tradables can increase trade tax revenue if tariff evasion and can fuel inflation; but an adequate reduction rates fall or if import demand is price elastic (that in the fiscal deficit can lower inflation under a is, if actual tariff rates exceed maximum-revenue devaluation.
tariff rates). Such increases in tariff revenue cannot be relied on, however. In a sample of counEffectiveness of trade reform under instability.
tries that primarily reformed nontariff barriers A second issue is whether trade policy reforms without lowering tariffs, tariff revenue increased will be productive when the macroeconomic situfrom 2.7 percent of GDP to 3.4 percent. But in a sample of countries that reduced tariffs as well as plementary effects: the benefits of trade policy implementing other reforms -among them reforms are usually greater when accompanied Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and Thailand by internal reforms. But successful trade reform--revenue fell on average from 2.8 percent of ers have not waited until all complementary re-GDP to 2.3 percent. The fiscal effects of a devaluforms and infrastructural investments are in place. ation in general depend on whether the governIn fact, the initiation of trade reforms often expoment is a net buyer of foreign exchange (Ghana, ses the need for domestic market reforms and inSierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda, and Zaire) or a vestments (Madagascar, Mexico, Tanzania, and net seller (Nigeria). In countries significantly deZaire)." 0 It also exposes the need to meet unforependent on tariff revenues, therefore, the reveseen infrastructural demands for industries based nue effects of specific trade reforms involving almost entirely on foreign demand (such as grapes tariff reductions should be evaluated before imin Chile; cut flowers in Colombia, and color teleplementation. Measures to reduce expenditure vision sets in Korea.) Sometimes internal reforms or enhance revenue from other sources (such as should even be deferred until it is clear to the consumption taxes) will need to be implemented business and financial communities that import to avoid any detrimental fiscal effect. Mexico protection will come down. Otherwise, if investgenerated additional revenue through tax reform ment or price controls are removed in highly when trade taxes fell; Morocco did not generate protected sectors, increased investment and pronew revenues, leading to a partial reversal of duction might be encouraged in the wrong secreform. In general, if tariff reform would exacertors. Conversely, trade policy reform may in bate the fiscal deficit and if that deficit is unduly some cases need to wait until an internal control high, offsetting fiscal measures are necessary.
is relaxed. For example, a processed product (such as textiles) may become rapidly disproSequencing trade and internal sector reforns.
tected if its tariffs are reduced while the price of In general, trade and internal reforms are best its basic input (cotton) set by a monopolistic parcarried out simultaneously because of their comastatal remains high. would interfere with the restructuring that is exLanka, and Zaire). Such a shift from commerpected to occur in the initial phase of liberalizacial policy protection to "exchange rate protection. The sooner the benefits of reform begin, tion" is a major step toward neutrality in incenthe better the prospects for sustainability. Some tives between and among exportables and imsuccessful reforms have been comprehensive, inport substitutes. Introducing other export poltensive, and fast, as in Bolivia. Mexico quickly icy reform shortly before, or at least at the same reduced the coverage of quantitative restrictions time as, import reforms permits an earlier exand reduced tariffs in about two years. Chile's port supply response and allows unification of phasing out of quantitative restrictions was rapid, the tariff structure to proceed without burdenwhile tariff reductions ran over five years. When ing exporters. Import policy reform often starts implementation is spread over a few years to by replacing nontariff barriers with tariffs progive affected activities time to adjust, it is desirviding roughly the same protection. This step, able to announce the trade reforms in advance, as well as eliminating tariff exemptions, imas Chile did with its tariff reforms. However, proves resource allocation, increases transparKorea carried out its comprehensive reforms over ency, reduces rent-seeking, and helps to improve 20 years, with substantial import liberalization the fiscal situation. These steps ought to be folsince 1980. While the decision on the pace of imlowed by a rationalization of the tariff structure port reform depends on country circumstances, to provide more uniform incentives. This raexperience suggests that a substantial and comtionalization should usually be accompanied or prehensive liberalization can be done in less than followed by a reduction in tariff rates to reduce five to seven years from the start of the adjustprotection, while any significant adverse effects ment program -including major and decisive on the fiscal deficit are offset. Depending on actions in the first year.
Trade Policy Measures

Exchange Rate Policy Export Policy
Exports and import substitutes. The real exchange Prerequisites for manufactured export growth. The rate should help to attain equilibrium in the balmacroeconomic stability of low fiscal deficits, low ance of payments and domestic markets and be inflation rates, and stable and adequate exchange compatible with growth in tradables and output rates has been the hallmark of East Asia's ecoover the longer term. An overvalued domestic nomic success. Relatively low protection of imcurrency indirectly taxes exportables and lightly port substitutes helps to sustain a lower real exprotected importables and favors nontradables change rate than would otherwise be the case. It and importables protected by binding restrictions. also makes it easier to administer schemes that The uncertainty of fluctuations in the real exexempt exporters from restrictions and tariffs on change rate also hurts exports. A real devalutheir imported inputs. A few East Asian econoation, accompanied by exchange rate unification mies have nevertheless been successful with where relevant for different goods, improves the import protection. They have done this by avoidincentives for exports and efficient import substiing exchange rate overvaluation and by using tutes. 1 2 A devaluation should be accompanied export measures to offset the antiexport bias from by macroeconomic policies to restrain inflation import protection. But Korea's approach during and sustain the real exchange rate. A crawling the 1960s and 1970s would be difficult for other peg system -with supportive macroeconomnic countries to replicate in today's world economy. policies that avoid real exchange rate appreciaThe approach included export subsidies, which tion -helped many countries to prevent domesother countries would countervail today. Renttic inflation from offsetting the nominal exchange seeking activities viewed as incompatible with rate adjustment (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and export growth were vigorously suppressed Turkey). Cote d'Ivoire's currency, like that of through government intervention. Most reformother countries in Francophone Africa, is pegged ing countries in the 1980s have carried out some at a fixed rate to the French franc. Its reform import liberalization, supported by adjustment program floundered in part because a simulated lending and IMF programs. About a third of the devaluation using import tariffs and export subcountries that have received trade adjustment sidies was not fully implemented and proved to loans increased their share of exports to indusbe a poor substitute for devaluation.
trial countries (table 3) . Imported inputs used by exporters. Import provide duty waivers (and exemptions from other protection biases against exports by driving up import restrictions) or temporary admissions of the exchange rate and making import substituimported inputs (India, Indonesia, Mexico, Motion more profitable.
While exporters face world rocco, and Turkey). For small or irregular exprices for their output, import protection increases porters for which waivers or temporary admisthe costs and reduces the availability of the insion schemes are impractical, a quick, reliable puts used in exports.
This bias can be partly system can use drawbacks or rebates of duties offset by schemes to reduce input costs. A lesson and indirect taxes actually paid (India; Korea; from the East Asian experience is that giving diTaiwan, China; and Thailand). But collecting rect and indirect exporters restriction-free access and refunding duties is less efficient than waivto inputs at duty and tax-free international prices ing duties, and drawbacks do not offset nontariff is particularly effective.1 3 One way is to have an barriers. essentially free trade regime, with no tariffs or restrictions on imports (Hong Kong and Singapore).
Other alternatives and costs.
A dutyThis eliminates the need for schemes to insulate free scheme to export firms that allows inexporters, which have administrative requirebond manufacturing plants to locate almost ments that are difficult to meet in some countries.
anywhere can be provided (Mauritius, MexIn regimes with import protection, one approach ico). An alternative, used in more than thirty dethat can be used for larger firms that import inveloping countries, is to establish physically sepaputs for export and domestic production is to rate export processing zones. However, many of these zones have proved to be poor investments
Exports of commodities.
Exports from prias a result of unwise location, high investment mary sectors are frequently discouraged by taxes, costs, mediocre management, or uncooperative an overvalued exchange rate, low administered customs officials, but the best ones have done prices, and inefficient government marketing mowell. Duty-free schemes for exporters' inputs nopolies, as well as by industrial protection and also involve costs, such as drawing resources from restrictions on foreign investment. For some key more efficient activities, temporarily increasing a agricultural products that compete with temperfiscal deficit," penalizing domestic suppliers of ate zone agriculture, export growth is also conimportable inputs, and creating new opportunistrained by industrial countries' protection. For ties for rent-seeking. The schemes offer pragothers, export growth is constrained by the slow matic ways to offset import protection, but their growth and price inelasticity of demand. Many benefits need to be balanced against their costs countries have removed some of these obstacles. for revenues and other economic activities. ExMalaysia in the 1960s and Chile in the later 1970s port subsidies have also been successfully used created a positive policy environment for priby a few countries (Korea), but in general they mary exports, with good results. In the 1980s Boare seldom efficient and are likely to be counterlivia and Ghana opened mining to foreign investvailed by other countries. ment. Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, and Turkey improved producer Supporting actions for manufactured exports.
prices for leading primary product exports by Exporters of manufactures must meet exacting eliminating direct or implicit taxes. Argentina and frequently changing requirements and must and Uruguay reduced export taxes, but the acdeliver their products reliably and on time. To tion was quickly reversed in Argentina for reado this, they need support in efficient infrastrucsons of revenue. Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, ture and telecommunications, readily available and Tanzania reduced regulatory controls on export credit, technology development, quality exports. Malaysia and Thailand achieved suscontrol, production planning, and trade logistics.
tained and strong growth in primary exports by The East Asian experience suggests the value of avoiding major currency overvaluation, heavy relaxing regulations for all firms on layoffs, fringe taxation of the sector, and high protection of benefits, minimum wages, and collective action, manufacturing industries. Ghana, Madagascar, to reduce labor costs and increase flexibility at Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tanzania eliminated the enterprise level. 15 Industrial location and public sector marketing boards or stripped them regional development policies may also have to of their monopoly procurement powers. Such be changed, since exports on a large scale cannot reforms can significantly increase primary be expected from backward areas with poor inexports. Cross-country evidence indicates frastructure. It may also help to assist exporters an exchange rate elasticity for primary exin securing technical assistance services from ports almost as large as that for all merconsultants and information suppliers of their chandise (including primary) exports; the choice. Much of the Bank's technical assisfirst elasticity is even larger than the second tance to exporters has been channeled through in a sample of Sub-Saharan Africa countries. official export promotion organizations, with disappointing results. Foreign firms can also Export diversification. Although primary provide a good source of capital and technolproducts have in some cases contributed much to ogy. Policies attractive to foreign investors exports and incomes, for exporters of tropical include macroeconomic stability, protection primary products as a whole, significantly greater of property rights (including intellectual export growth will also require export diversifiproperty rights), a stable and transparent cation. Elements of agricultural diversification regulatory environment, and liberal access include: research, seed selection, access to techto foreign exchange for profit remittances nical implements, cold storage, marketing, and and imported inputs and services. This kind foreign distribution. Wide price fluctuations of of good climate for investment is likely to be primary commodities in the world markets are superior to special incentives, such as tax holialso a concern, but beyond the scope of this redays, which may attract footloose industries that port. leave when the holiday is over. Import Policy the advantage of being less subject to lobbying. Some of the more successful reformers (Bolivia, Nontariff barriers. Import licensing, prohibitions, Chile, and Mexico) have converged their tariff exemptions, quotas, official reference prices, and structures toward 15 percent, in addition to nearly foreign exchange allocation schemes are common eliminating quantitative restrictions, while some nontariff barriers. Because they depend on disothers have reduced tariffs to below 30 percent. cretionary decisions by the authorities, they make For uniformity to be strictly optimal, however, it the system less transparent and predictable and may be necessary to supplement uniform tariffs encourage lobbying, corruption, and rent-seekwith consumption taxes to minimize consumping. Even with little or no decrease in protection, tion distortions. Although uniformity minimizes a reduction of nontariff barriers can have major production distortions for a given protection level salutary effects. One simple reform is to switch for importables, raising low rates encourages from a positive import list (which allows unlidomestic production of products whose rates are censed imports only of listed items) to a negative raised, perhaps drawing resources from exports. list (which allows unlicensed imports of all items If low rates on inputs are to be raised, exporters not listed). This was the first major step in Korea's would need to be insulated from paying prices liberalization program in 1967. Auction systems above world levels for these protected inputs. can sometimes substitute for administrative rationing. In quantitative quota systems, quotas
Methods of tariff reform. Among the paths can be auctioned, with the quota amount into a relatively low and uniform tariff structure, creased until its protective value falls to zero, at the most difficult to implement seems to be an inwhich time it can be abolished. Alternatively, dustry-by-industry approach, since changes in tariffs providing roughly equivalent protection one industry may have repercussions in others. can be imposed on product categories as nontarWhat seems to be better is a "concertina" apiff controls are eliminated. This approach reproach, whereby at each stage all the top rates are establishes the link between domestic and intercollapsed to the next highest level. Even better is national prices, ensuring that they move in the a "radial" reduction, in which all rates at each same direction and do not diverge by more than step are cut to an equal fraction of their previous the amount of the tariff.
level, thereby reducing protection as well as tariff rates at each step. While radial tariff reduction Structure of tariffs. On efficiency and popromises faster production efficiency gains than litical economy grounds, a relatively low, relathe concertina approach, it is more likely to retively uniform tariff structure is preferred among duce revenue in its first stages. 17 A combined apfeasible options. Because tariffs on finished prodproach might thus be the best path to greater ucts are usually higher than on intermediates uniformity: collapsing the very high rates, and and raw materials, and because tariff exemptions radially reducing all other rates -subject to the are common, effective protection varies greatly revenue constraint. across industries. In most countries, production efficiency requires that effective protection be rePolicies toward Trading Partners duced, and that protection be rationalized among imports, taking into account the protective effect Multilateral negotiations. Newly industrialized of the domestic tax system. But tariffs also genercountries have much to gain from reduced exterate revenue. By coordinating tariff reform with nal barriers to their exports. They also have some domestic tax reform, deeper reductions in tariffs leverage in the Uruguay round negotiations since are more possible than otherwise. The reducthe industrial countries want them to open their tions should eventually result in a low, equal rate markets. In contrast, countries interested in agriof tax on consumption of imports and domesticultural issues may need to negotiate as a group cally produced products. 16 Raising low tariff rates if they are to have leverage. One issue for devel-(usually on inputs) also increases revenue, allowoping countries, particularly those with some leving high rates to be reduced further, and makes erage, is whether to reduce barriers unilaterally effective protection more uniform between inor to delay reforms in order to gain concessions puts and finished goods. In general, a relatively in multilateral negotiations. The issue could be low, relatively uniform tariff structure also has resolved if all negotiating parties in the Uruguay Round were to declare unambiguously that credit of consumers in the industrial countries and would be granted for unilateral reductions of threaten the world trading system. It is thus in barriers. This issue is currently being addressed the interest of all countries that industrial counby some negotiating groups in the Round, though tries act forcefully to reform these policies, imit is not yet clear what, if any, mechanism will be proving global welfare. developed. An alternative is to bind tariffs at a higher level than the actual level, and to offer to Regional integration. The potential for exreduce the bound level during negotiations. But panding trade with neighbors has led some counthis approach requires a credible threat to raise tries to form regional groups. These groups were tariffs to the bound level if negotiations fail, as expected to allow members to realize gains from well as a credible commitment not to raise the increased trade, to take advantage of economies actual tariffs -by resorting to article XVIII -if of scale by enabling them to produce for a renegotiations succeed. For most countries, the gional market, and to provide initial exporting costs that their trade policies impose are likely to experience under protection. But intraregional be higher than the costs imposed by other countrade expanded little or sometimes even fell. Intries' barriers, an argument for unilateral reforms.
dustries established as a result of integration usually had high production costs, and experiIndustrial countries. Industrial counence gained in markleting to neighbors proved try tariffs have been reduced from an averless than useful for exporting to wider markets. age of 40 percent in the late 1940s to less And most regional groups raised barriers against than 5.5 percent today. But nontariff barriextraregional trade, discouraging integration into ers have increased, with the proportion of the world economy, where the gains from trade developed country imports affected by nonare likely to be greater. Despite the shortcomtariff barriers nearly doubling over 1966-ings, integration efforts continue, more success-86. More than 90 percent of OECD imports fully among countries with generally outwardof foodstuffs are now affected by some type of oriented economies (ASEAN or the European nontariff barrier. This change, coupled with the countries). Two lessons from the experience with surpluses resulting from high OECD agricultural integration efforts are noteworthy. First, integrasupport prices, has distorted and destabilized agtion schemes should focus more on improving ricultural markets. Although quotas are someinfrastructure and factor mobility than on trade times a problem (especially in textiles and steel), policy measures. Increased trade would follow industrial country markets remain attractive for naturally. Second, any trade policy measures a wide range of manufactured exports. Nonetheshould focus on reducing barriers to all trade, not less, the nontariff barriers and agricultural polijust trade among members. The Central Americies in the industrial countries reduce the potencan Common Market, for example, has explicitly tial benefits from trade reforms by developing recognized the need not to impede member councountries and make reforms politically more diftries' progress in overall trade reform. ficult. Studies show that they reduce the welfare 5
Complementary Policies
Fiscal policy. Fiscal and trade policy should be coon guarantees of high protection. Liquidation ordinated to avoid exacerbating the fiscal deficit would probably be preferable to privatization in and overvaluation of the real exchange rate. Fisthese cases. In socialist countries, trade liberalical policy can also complement trade reforms by zation needs to be accompanied by phasing out making tax rates on domestically produced final the central planning and allocation mechanisms, goods equal to tariff rates on their imports, rethus allowing the new market signals to be effecducing protection, raising revenue, and allowing tive for firms and farms (Poland). Parastatal tariff rates to be reduced further (Malawi, Nigedomination of crop output markets might mean nra, and Togo). Fiscal policy could also complethat the effects of devaluation on producer prices ment trade reform by ensuring that public inare realized very slowly while input prices rise vestment supports the reforms. Public investquickly. Or it might mean that a protected procment budgets have fallen in many countries (C6te essed product (such as textiles) becomes rapidly d'Ivoire, Mexico, Morocco, and the Philippines), disprotected if its tariffs are reduced while the with expenditure cuts concentrated on the capiprice of a basic input (cotton) remains high. Meantal account rather than on the current account ingful trade liberalization in such cases may call (with its overhead expenditures and frequently for abolishing the parastatal (Ecuador) or elimihigh interest components). Efficient investments nating its legal monopoly in the import market in infrastructure, and expenditures for research (Mexico). A corrupt or inefficient customs servand extension services, are important to get full ice can also reduce the response of the trade secadvantage from increased trade incentives. Some tor to reforms, calling for improvement as greater successful reformers have raised the share of reliance is placed on tariffs. In many cases, adpublic investment (Chile, Korea, and Turkey); ministrative problems have led to delays in the others have lowered it. In either case, the key is introduction of tariff reforms, export tax rebates, to ensure that the investments are efficient and duty relief systems for exporters, and bonded appropriate to support the adjustment to policy warehouses. reforms.
Regulatory 
6
Credibility and Sustainability Political economy. If the private sector is to invest pean Community began lowering barriers to trade in new sectors, it must believe that the changed with the outside world in the 1950s, but it has yet incentives will be sustained. If not, firms in preto be tried in the developing world. viously protected sectors may invest in lobbying efforts and go deeply into debt trying to "ride out Compensatory measures. Successful trade the storm" until their protection is restored. To policy reform, despite its associated net benefits, be credible, the first steps of reform should gencan have short-term transitional costs. Some erally be clear and decisive: reforms begun with segrnents of the population may become worse tentative steps have often been reversed. Public off.
Steps to partly compensate losers may incommitment of the head of state through a strong crease the odds that the reforms will be sustained announcement of the program can also be imporand bring other benefits as well. Some compentant in establishing credibility. And a general satory measures, such as worker retraining, can interest agency (central bank or finance ministry) improve factor mobility, speeding the intersecis usually more reliable than one with specific toral adjustment. Other measures, such as antiprotectionistic interests (ministry of trade or indumping procedures (set up in Chile, Mexico), dustry) in executing a reform program. Credible can reduce resistance to the reduction of more announcement of a timetable -while carrying costly forms of protection. Devaluation can also the risk of giving the opposition time to mobilize be viewed as a measure to partly compensate for against the reform -can usually strengthen the the loss of protection, and thereby reduce politireform if the timetable is adhered to (Korea).
cal resistance. Other steps, such as targeted food Reforms are generally easier to introduce after a assistance programs and employment programs, crisis that discredits old policies. Since the crisis can offset the transitional effects of adjustment is often related to the balance of payments, a measures on real wages and employment. Often, strong devaluation and macroeconomic adjusthowever, workers displaced from protected inment is probably necessary and useful in sending dustries are not among the poorest groups in the a signal to producers, whose supply response society. Moreover, new programs run the risk of will help to justify the program. Sustainability creating new distortions and exacerbating fiscal may also be enhanced by an external commitdeficits. But the compensation issue needs to be ment to maintain reforms, such as joining the addressed, and pragmatic means found to target GATT, which raises the costs of reversing the programs well. A UNDP/World Bank proreforms. 1 8 In some cases, reforms may be more gram has been providing technical assistance to politically acceptable, credible, and sustainable if countries on trade reforms, including the quescarried out under regional auspices. This appartion of transitional costs. 19 ently was a successful approach when the Euro-Notes 1. Trade policy reforms are expected to intions can be costly, even though a mild and temcrease exports and improve the balance of payporary overshooting of neutrality might be justiments. Nevertheless, a higher trade deficit might fied in order to encourage resource reallocation. accompany the reforms initially because exports might not respond as quickly as imports in the 6. Through June 1989, there were 98 loans to short term.
44 countries that contained significant trade policy components. 2. On the other hand, a case is made in some of the recent literature for strategic targeting of 7. Among the 40 trade loan recipients, imgovernment interventions as means for increasplementation data were available for 24. Deing export success.
tailed findings on implementation refer to the 24, while aggregation data were also considered for 3. For the most part, the report considers the 40 as well as for 47 nonrecipients. policy changes during 1979-87 and country performance during 1979-88. This analysis is in-8. Usually the estimates compare the real tended to complement and extend the previous effective exchange rates (taking into account World Bank work on the long-term experience import tariffs and export subsidies) for exportwith trade policy presented in M. Michaely, D.
ables versus that for importables, in addition to Papageorgiou, and A. Choksi, Liberalizing Foreign comparisons of domestic relative prices. Trade: Lessons of Experience in the Developing World (forthcoming); and World Development Reports, 9. Real exchange rate adjustment and export-1986 and 1987. related reform were primarily beneficial in some cases examined (Pakistan and Thailand). Almost 4. Such liberalization enhances welfare by all examples from the 1980s of import policy rereducing the economic costs of discretionary trade form also involved a real exchange rate depreciacontrols, such as rent-seeking, corruption, and tion, and this combination was beneficial (Chile, induced distortions in domestic markets. Jamaica, and Mexico).
5. For example, in the face of pervasive dis-10. To take one example, deficiencies in trucktortions, some types of partial trade liberalization ing and port regulations in Mexico became more can be welfare-reducing. Similarly, ill-designed evident when expanding exports increased the export subsidies or measures to go well beyond demand for transport services. neutrality to a pro-export bias through interven-11. Countries with multiple exchange rates in lish a full range of industries that provide interthe goods market can gain from unifying them at mediate inputs at costs and prices below world this time.
trade prices, based on highly efficient technology, location scale, and production operations. 12. A devaluation, of course, should not be carried out strictly as an export promotion meas-16. Equal tax rates on imports and domestic ure. Competitive devaluations designed simply production, or alternatively consumption, of luxuto undercut competitors on world markets should ries would be preferable to the use of import be avoided. Rather, devaluation should be conrestriction alone, if the objective is to discourage sidered a means to restore equilibrium in internal the consumption of such items. and external markets and encourage long-run growth.
17. In contrast, the concertina approach concentrates initial reductions on very high rates, at 13. This avoids wide variations in effective least some of which may be so high that reducing incentives between different exports which use them will increase import volume and tariff reveinputs subject to different import controls and nues. tariffs. It is not subject to the countervailing measures which importing countries are increas-18. However, the value of this commitment is ingly applying to direct or indirect export subsidecreased by the easy access developing coundies.
tries have to GATT provisions that allow them to impose barriers for purposes of correcting bal-14. Short-run negative revenue effects may ance of payments disequilibria or protecting inoccur when protection of inputs is principally fant industries. provided by tariffs. Tariff revenue should increase, however, as expanding exports increase 19. The UNDP/World Bank technical assisthe supply of foreign exchange for imports.
tance program for trade expansion has been involved in Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Poland, 15. An ambitious but effective strategy used Uganda, and Uruguay. by Korea and Taiwan, China has been to estab-
